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Abstract
As humans, we inherently perceive images based on their
predominant features, and ignore noise embedded within
lower bit planes. On the contrary, Deep Neural Networks
are known to confidently misclassify images corrupted with
meticulously crafted perturbations that are nearly imper-
ceptible to the human eye. In this work, we attempt to
address this problem by training networks to form coarse
impressions based on the information in higher bit planes,
and use the lower bit planes only to refine their prediction.
We demonstrate that, by imposing consistency on the repre-
sentations learned across differently quantized images, the
adversarial robustness of networks improves significantly
when compared to a normally trained model. Present state-
of-the-art defenses against adversarial attacks require the
networks to be explicitly trained using adversarial samples
that are computationally expensive to generate. While such
methods that use adversarial training continue to achieve
the best results, this work paves the way towards achieving
robustness without having to explicitly train on adversar-
ial samples. The proposed approach is therefore faster, and
also closer to the natural learning process in humans.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks have been used to achieve re-
markable performance in many Computer Vision tasks,
such as Classification [15], Segmentation [20] and Object
recognition [25]. While these networks achieve near-human
accuracy on many benchmark datasets, they are far from be-
ing as robust as the human visual system. Deep Networks
are known to be vulnerable to carefully crafted impercep-
tible noise known as Adversarial Perturbations [32], which
could have disastrous implications in critical applications
such as autonomous navigation and surveillance systems.
The compelling need of securing these systems, coupled
with the goal of improving the worst-case robustness of
∗Equal contribution
Deep Networks has propelled research in the area of Adver-
sarial Robustness over the last few years. While adversarial
training methods [22, 42] have led to significant progress in
improving adversarial robustness, these methods are com-
putationally expensive and also non-intuitive when com-
pared to the learning process in humans.
Humans perceive images based on features of large mag-
nitude and use finer details only to enhance their impres-
sions [31, 30]. This background knowledge of giving higher
importance to information present in higher bit planes natu-
rally equips the human visual system to develop resistance
towards adversarial perturbations, which are of relatively
lower magnitude. On the contrary, these adversarial pertur-
bations can arbitrarily flip the predictions of Deep Networks
to completely unrelated classes, suggesting that such back-
ground knowledge of giving hierarchical importance to dif-
ferent bit planes is missing in these networks. In this work,
we propose to equip Deep Networks with such knowledge,
and demonstrate that this improves their robustness to ad-
versarial examples.
We propose a novel Bit Plane Feature Consistency
(BPFC) regularizer, which can significantly improve adver-
sarial robustness of models, without exposure to adversarial
samples during training. The proposed method is consider-
ably faster than methods that require multi-step adversarial
samples for training [22], and is therefore scalable to large
datasets such as ImageNet. Through this work, we hope to
pave the path towards training robust Deep Networks with-
out using adversarial samples, similar to the learning pro-
cess that exists in human beings.
The organization of this paper is as follows: The subse-
quent section presents a discussion on the existing literature
related to our work. Section-3 lays out the preliminaries
related to notation and threat model. This is followed by
details and analysis of our proposed approach in Section-
4. We present the experiments performed and an analysis
on the results in Section-5, followed by our concluding re-
marks in Section-6.
The code and pretrained models are available at:
https://github.com/val-iisc/BPFC.
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2. Related Works
2.1. Adversarial Training methods
The most popular methods of improving adversarial ro-
bustness of Deep Networks involve Adversarial Training
(AT), where clean data samples are augmented with adver-
sarial samples during training. Early formulations such as
FGSM-AT [10] proposed training on adversarial samples
generated using single-step optimization, that assumes a
first-order linear approximation to the loss function. This
was later shown to be ineffective against multi-step attacks
by Kurakin et al. [17], wherein the effect of gradient mask-
ing was identified. Gradient masking, first identified by
Papernot et al. [24], is the phenomenon where the trained
network yields masked gradients, thereby resulting in the
generation of weak adversaries, leading to a false sense of
robustness. In a wide variety of settings, numerous coun-
termeasures have been developed that can produce strong
adversaries to circumvent gradient masking [33].
Madry et al. [22] proposed Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) based training, that employs an iterative procedure
for finding strong adversaries that maximise training loss
under the given norm constraint. Crucially, PGD trained
models are robust against various gradient-based iterative
attacks, as well as several variants of non-gradient based
attacks. However, the process of PGD Adversarial Training
(PGD-AT) is computationally expensive.
In order to address this, Vivek et al. [37] revisited single-
step adversarial training, and introduced a regularizer that
helps mitigate the effect of gradient masking. This regu-
larizer penalizes the `2 distance between logits of images
perturbed with FGSM and R-FGSM [33] attacks. In the
proposed method, we achieve adversarial robustness with-
out using adversarial samples during training, and hence
achieve a further reduction in computation time.
2.2. Attempts of Adversary-Free Training
In this section, we discuss existing training methods that
do not utilize adversarial samples during training. Works
such as Mixup [41] and Manifold-Mixup [36] propose train-
ing methods to learn better feature representations. In
Mixup, the network is trained to map a random convex
combination of the input data to the corresponding con-
vex combination of their one-hot encodings. This work is
extended further in Manifold Mixup, where the network
is trained to map a convex combination of intermediate
hidden-layers generated by two different data points to the
corresponding convex combination of their one-hot encod-
ings. Hence, these methods encourage the network to be-
have in a linearized manner between input data points, or
between hidden-layers deeper in the network. While these
methods resulted in improved performance against single-
step FGSM attacks, they were susceptible to stronger multi-
step attacks.
Another attempt of adversary-free training to achieve ro-
bustness utilized input transformations for defense. In the
work by Guo et al. [11], the effect of various input trans-
formations such as bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression,
total variation minimisation and image quilting was studied.
The robustness from these techniques primarily originated
from the non-differentiable pre-processing steps, in order
to possibly thwart gradient-based iterative attacks. This
method, along with a few others [2, 21, 6, 39, 29], were
broken in the work by Athalye et al. [1], where it was iden-
tified that obfuscated gradients do not provide reliable secu-
rity against adversaries.
Yet another avenue pursued was towards the detection of
adversarial samples. Feature Squeezing, proposed by Xu et
al. [40], used transformations such as reduction of color bit
depth, spatial smoothing with a median filter and a com-
bination of both, in order to generate a feature-squeezed
image from a given input image. By thresholding the `1
distance between logits of an input image and its feature-
squeezed counterpart, the image was classified to be either
adversarial or legitimate in nature. However, in the work by
He et al. [13], it was shown that an adaptive attacker cog-
nizant of this defense strategy could fool the model by con-
structing attacks that retain adversarial properties even after
feature-squeezing is applied, thereby evading detection.
While we use the concept of quantization to defend
against adversarial attacks in this work, we do not intro-
duce any pre-processing blocks that lead to obfuscated or
shattered gradients.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Notation
In this paper, we consider f(.) as the function mapping
of a classifier C, from an image x, to its corresponding soft-
max output f(x). The predicted class label, which is an
argmax over the softmax output, is denoted by c(x). The
ground truth label corresponding to x is denoted by y. The
image is said to be correctly classified when c(x) = y. The
pre-softmax output of the classifier C is denoted by g(x).
We define A(x) to be the set of all Adversarial Samples
corresponding to x. A specific adversarial sample corre-
sponding to a clean sample x is denoted by x′.
3.2. Threat Model
In this paper, we consider the task of improving the
worst-case robustness of Deep Networks. The goal of an
adversary is to cause an error in the prediction of the classi-
fier. We define an Adversarial Sample x′, as one that causes
the output of the network to be different from the ground
truth label y. We do not restrict the adversary to flip labels
from a specific source class, or to a specific target class. We
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 1: (a) Original 8-bit image (b) Weighted sum of (higher) bit planes 7, 6 and 5 (c) Weighted sum of (higher) bit planes
7 and 6 (d) Bit plane 7 - Most significant bit plane (e) Weighted sum of (lower) bit planes 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0.
restrict x′ to be in the `∞-ball of radius ε around x. The set
of Adversarial Samples can be formally defined as follows:
A(x) = {x′ : c(x′) 6= y, ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ ε} (1)
We therefore impose a constraint that any individual pixel
in the image x cannot be perturbed by more than ε.
Since the goal of this work is to improve worst-case ro-
bustness, we do not impose any restrictions on the access
to the adversary. We consider that the adversary has com-
plete knowledge of the model architecture, weights and the
defense mechanism employed.
4. Proposed Method
In this section, we first present the motivation behind our
proposed method, followed by a detailed discussion of the
proposed algorithm. We further describe local properties of
networks trained using the proposed regularizer, which lead
to improved robustness.
4.1. Hierarchical Importance of Bit Planes
Bit planes of an image are the spatial maps (of the same
dimension as the image) corresponding to a given bit posi-
tion. For an n-bit representation of an image, bit plane n−1
corresponds to the most significant bit (MSB), and bit plane
0 corresponds to the least significant bit (LSB). An n-bit im-
age can be considered as the sum of n bit planes weighted
by their relative importance. The importance of features
embedded within lower bit planes is significantly lower
than that of features embedded within higher bit planes,
both in terms of pixel value, and information content [27].
Steganography methods [9] utilize lower bit planes to em-
bed crucial copyright information that needs to be visually
imperceptible. However, information content in natural im-
ages decreases from the most significant bit (MSB) to the
least significant bit (LSB). A weighted sum of the five least
significant bit planes of the image in Fig.1(a) is shown in
Fig.1(e), from which it is evident that lower bit planes con-
tribute only to fine details. Fig.1(b), (c) and (d) show im-
ages ranging from fine to coarse structure, with different
levels of quantization. The difference between Fig.1(a) and
Fig.1(b) is Fig.1(e). While the addition of Fig.1(e) certainly
improves the information content, it is not as crucial as the
higher bit planes for interpreting the image.
The human visual system is known to give higher impor-
tance to global information when compared to fine details
[30]. Sugase et al. [31] demonstrate that global information
is used for coarse classification in early parts of the neural
response, while information related to fine details is per-
ceived around 51ms later. This demonstrates a hierarchical
classification mechanism, where the response to an image
containing both coarse and fine information is aligned with
that containing only coarse information.
We take motivation from this aspect of the human vi-
sual system, and enforce Deep Networks to maintain consis-
tency across decisions based on features in high bit planes
alone (quantized image) and all bit planes (normal image).
Such a constraint will ensure that Deep Networks give more
importance to high bit planes when compared to lower bit
planes, similar to the human visual system. Adversarial
examples constrained to the `∞-ball utilize low bit planes
to transmit information which is inconsistent with that of
higher bit planes. The fact that Deep Networks are suscep-
tible to such adversarial noise demonstrates the weakness
of these networks, which emanates from the lack of con-
sistency between predictions corresponding to coarse infor-
mation and fine details. Therefore, enforcing feature consis-
tency across bit planes results in a significant improvement
in adversarial robustness when compared to conventionally
trained networks.
While we use the base-2 (binary) representation of an
image to illustrate the concept of ignoring low magnitude
additive noise, the same can be formulated in terms of
any other representation (in any other base) as well. Sec-
ondly, low magnitude noise does not always reside in low
bit planes. It can overflow to MSBs as well, based on the
pixel values in the image. We introduce pre-quantization
noise in our proposed approach to mitigate these effects.
This is illustrated in the following section, where we ex-
plain our proposed method in greater detail.
4.2. Proposed Training Algorithm
We present the proposed training method in Algorithm-
1. Motivated by the need to learn consistent representations
for coarse and fine features of an image, we introduce a
regularizer that imposes feature consistency between each
image and its quantized counterpart.
Algorithm 1: Bit Plane Feature Consistency
Input: Network f with parameters θ, fixed weight λ,
training data D = {(xi, yi)} of n-bit images, quantiz-
ation parameter k, learning rate η, minibatch size M
for minibatch B ⊂ D do
Set L = 0
for i = 1 to M do
xpre = xi + U(−2k−2, 2k−2) // Add noise
xq = xpre −
(
xpre mod 2
k
)
// Quantization
xq = xq + 2
k−1 // Range Shift
xq = min(max(xq, 0), 2
n − 1) // Clip
L = L+ ce(f(xi), yi) + λ ‖g(xi)− g(xq)‖22
end for
θ = θ − 1M · η · ∇θL // SGD update
end for
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Figure 2: Quantization of a given 8-bit pixel to 3-bits (n =
8, k = 5): The probability P of a pixel i being assigned to
the quantized values q(i) = 48, 80 and 112 is shown here.
4.2.1 Quantization
The steps followed for generating a coarse image are de-
scribed in this section. The input image xi is assumed to be
represented using n-bit quantization. The intensity of pixels
is hence assumed to be in the range [0, 2n). We generate an
n−k+1 bit image using the quantization process described
here. The allowed range of k is between 1 and n− 1.
• Pre-quantization noise: Initially, uniform noise sam-
pled independently from U(−2k−2, 2k−2) is added to
each pixel in the image xi, to generate xpre.
• Quantization step: Next, each pixel is quantized to
n− k bits, by setting the last k bits to 0.
• Range Shift: The intensity of all pixels is shifted up
by 2k−1. This shifts the range of quantization error
(w.r.t. xpre) from [0, 2k) to [−2k−1, 2k−1).
• Clip: Finally, the quantized image is clipped to the
original range, [0, 2n).
Fig.2 illustrates the probability of a pixel i being as-
signed to different quantization levels using the above
method, when n = 8 and k = 5. As shown in the figure,
addition of pre-quantization noise introduces randomness in
the quantized value of each pixel. The probability of being
assigned the nearest quantization level is 1 when the input
pixel intensity is close to the quantized value, and decays
linearly to 0 after a fixed distance. This helps mitigate un-
wanted non-linear effects at the edges of each quantization
bin, due to specific pixel intensity values of the original im-
age.
We do an ablation experiment (in Section-5) called Sim-
ple Quantization, where the pre-quantization noise is not
added. Simple Quantization can be also viewed as addition
of correlated low magnitude (quantization) noise, where the
noise pattern depends on local pixel intensity levels. This
noise is the difference between the original image, and the
image subject to simple quantization. Since the pixel in-
tensities can be assumed to be locally correlated in space,
the noise is also correlated locally. The correlated nature of
noise differentiates quantization noise from random noise,
and also brings it closer to the properties of adversarial per-
turbations. We also consider an ablation experiment of re-
placing the quantization step with addition of random noise
sampled from a uniform distribution in Section-5.
While pre-quantization noise disturbs the local correla-
tion properties of the quantization noise for some of the
pixels, it is crucial to mitigate the bin edge effects discussed
above. We demonstrate through experiments that the pro-
posed solution is better than both the ablation experiments
discussed above.
4.2.2 Bit Plane Feature Consistency Regularizer
The loss function used for training is shown below:
L =
1
M
M∑
i=1
ce(f(xi), yi) + λ‖g(xi)− g(q(xi))‖22 (2)
For a given image xi, the first term of Eq. (2) is the
cross-entropy (ce) loss obtained from the softmax output of
the network f(xi), and the corresponding ground truth la-
bel yi. The second term is the squared `2 distance between
the pre-softmax activation of the image xi, and that of the
corresponding quantized image q(xi) (generated using the
process described in Section-4.2.1). We call this squared
`2 loss term as the Bit Plane Feature Consistency (BPFC)
regularizer, as it ensures that the network learns consistent
feature representations across the original image as well as
the coarse quantized image. The loss for each minibatch of
size M is an average over all samples in the minibatch.
The cross-entropy term on original images ensures that
a combination of coarse and fine features is used to learn
the overall function mapping g(.). This helps preserve the
accuracy on clean images, while the BPFC regularizer helps
improve the adversarial robustness of the model.
4.3. Local Properties of BPFC Trained Networks
In this section, we examine local properties of the func-
tion g(.) learned using the proposed BPFC regularizer.
Let xi denote an n-bit image sampled from the data dis-
tribution PD with pixel intensities in the range [0, 2n), and
let q(xi) denote a quantized image corresponding to xi. We
assume that q(xi) is not identically equal to xi. For a fixed
value of λ, let Θg(λ) denote the set of parameters corre-
sponding to a family of functions that lead to the cross-
entropy term in Eq. (2) being below a certain threshold.
Minimization of BPFC loss among the family of functions
parameterized by Θg(λ) is shown in Eq. (3):
min
θg∈Θg(λ)
Exi∼PD Eq(xi) ‖g(xi)− g(q(xi))‖22 (3)
min
θg∈Θg(λ)
Exi∼PD Eq(xi)
‖g(xi)− g(q(xi))‖22
‖xi − q(xi)‖22
(4)
The expression in Eq. (3) can be lower bounded by the
expression in Eq. (4), which is equivalent to minimizing the
local Lipschitz constant of the network at each sample xi.
The denominator of the objective function in Eq. (4) is the
`2-norm between each image and its quantized counterpart,
and is thus independent of θg . Therefore, minimization of
BPFC loss in Eq. (3) can be viewed as minimization of the
local Lipschitz constant at each sample xi, weighted by an
`2-norm of its deviation from the quantized image. An ex-
pectation of this `2-norm term over all q(xi) (with differ-
ently sampled pre-quantization noise) converges to a con-
stant value for all samples, thereby establishing an equiva-
lence between the minimization of BPFC loss and the min-
imization of local Lipschitz constant of the network.
Hence, imposing BPFC regularizer encourages the net-
work to be locally Lipschitz continuous with a reduced Lip-
schitz constant. While the BPFC regularizer imposes local
smoothness, the cross-entropy term in Eq. (2) requires g(.)
to be a complex mapping for better accuracy on clean im-
ages. The final selection of θg would depend on λ, which is
typically selected based on the amount by which clean ac-
curacy can be traded-off for adversarial accuracy [42, 34].
During the initial epochs of training, the function learned is
relatively smooth. Hence, we start with a low value of λ and
step it up during training.
Therefore, the BPFC formulation leads to functions with
improved local properties, which is closely related to adver-
sarial robustness as explained by Szegedy et al. [32].
5. Experiments and Analysis
In this section, we discuss the experiments done to verify
the robustness of our proposed approach. We first describe
the datasets used and details on the training methodology
in Section-5.1, followed by an overview of the experiments
conducted in Section-5.2. We further present details on each
experiment and our analysis on the results in Sections-5.3 to
5.6. We follow the guidelines laid out by Athalye et al. [1]
and Carlini et al. [3] to ascertain the validity of our claim
on the achieved robustness.
5.1. Preliminaries
We use the benchmark datasets, CIFAR-10 [14],
Fashion-MNIST (F-MNIST) [38] and MNIST [18] for val-
idating our proposed approach. CIFAR-10 is a ten-class
dataset with RGB images of dimension 32× 32. The num-
ber of images in the training set and test set are 50, 000
and 10, 000 respectively. These images are equally dis-
tributed across all classes. We set aside 10, 000 images from
the training set as the validation set. Fashion-MNIST and
MNIST are ten-class datasets with gray-scale images of di-
mension 28 × 28. The datasets are composed of 60, 000
training samples and 10, 000 test samples each. We further
split each of the training datasets into 50, 000 training sam-
ples and 10, 000 validation samples.
We use ResNet-18 [12] architecture for CIFAR-10, and
a modified LeNet (M-LeNet) [19] architecture with two
additional convolutional layers (details in Table-S1 of the
Supplementary) for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. We train
CIFAR-10 models for 100 epochs, MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST models for 50 epochs each. The minibatch size is
set to 128 for CIFAR-10 and 64 for Fashion-MNIST and
MNIST. We use SGD optimizer with momentum of 0.9 and
weight decay of 5e-4. We use an initial learning rate of 0.1
for CIFAR-10, and 0.01 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST.
We reduce the initial learning rate by a factor of 5, three
times during the training process. We use early stopping
based on I-FGSM [16] accuracy on the validation split in
the last 20 epochs for CIFAR-10, and last 30 epochs for
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST.
The hyperparameters to be selected for training are: k,
which is the number of bits to be eliminated during the
quantization step in Section-4.2.1, and λ, which is the
weighting factor for BPFC loss in Eq. (2). We set k to 5
for CIFAR-10, 6 for Fashion-MNIST and 7 for MNIST. The
value of k can be selected based on the ε value of the attack
to be defended. λ is selected to achieve the desired trade-
off between accuracy on clean and adversarial samples (de-
tails in Section-S1.2 of the Supplementary). As explained
in Section-4.3, we start with a low value of λ and step it up
over epochs. This helps achieve better accuracy on clean
samples. For CIFAR-10, we start with λ of 1 and step it up
by a factor of 9 every 25 epochs. Since the clean accuracy
on Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets increases within
very few epochs, we use high λ values from the beginning
(without a step-up factor). We thus use a λ value of 30 for
MNIST and 25 for Fashion-MNIST.
5.2. Overview of Experiments
We compare the proposed approach with Normal Train-
ing (NT), FGSM-AT [10], PGD-AT [22] and Regularized
Single-Step Adversarial Training (RSS-AT) [37] across all
three datasets. We report results on single-step (FGSM) and
multi-step (I-FGSM, PGD) attacks, epsilon-bounded and
Table 1: CIFAR-10: Recognition accuracy (%) of models
in a white-box attack setting.
Training method Clean FGSM IFGSM PGD (n-steps)7 steps 7 20 1000
FGSM-AT 92.9 96.9 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.0
RSS-AT 82.3 55.0 50.9 50.0 46.2 45.8
PGD-AT 82.7 54.6 51.2 50.4 47.4 47.0
NT 92.3 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mixup 90.3 27.4 1.6 0.6 0.1 0.0
BPFC (Ours) 82.4 50.1 44.1 41.7 35.7 34.4
Ablations of the proposed approach (BPFC)
A1: Simple quant 82.6 49.2 41.4 38.8 31.6 30.1
A2: Uniform noise 82.6 48.7 42.3 40.0 33.3 31.9
A3: `1 norm 1 92.1 68.3 60.8 57.1 46.8 35.9
unbounded (DeepFool [23], Carlini-Wagner (C&W) [4]) at-
tacks, untargeted and targeted attacks, and gradient-free at-
tacks (random attacks, SPSA [35]). We consider attacks in
white-box and black-box settings. We also consider adap-
tive attacks that are specific to the defense mechanism used.
As explained in Section-3.2, we restrict the adversary to
be in the `∞-ball of radius ε around each data point. We
refer to the work by Madry et al. [22] for attack parame-
ters and number of iterations for PGD attack. For an image
with pixel intensities in the range [0, 1], we consider an ε
value of 8/255 for CIFAR-10, 0.3 for MNIST and 0.1 for
Fashion-MNIST. We consider εstep to be 2/255, 0.01 and
0.01 for CIFAR-10, MNIST and Fashion-MNIST respec-
tively. These restrictions do not apply to the unbounded
attacks, DeepFool and C&W.
We present our experiments, results and analysis for each
attack in the following subsections.
5.3. Performance against White-box Attacks
As explained in Section-3.2, we consider that the adver-
sary has access to the network architecture and weights. In
this scenario, white-box attacks are expected to be stronger
than black-box attacks (unless the model merely appears to
be robust due to gradient masking). In this section, we con-
sider the following types of white-box attacks: untargeted
and targeted ε-bounded attacks, and unbounded attacks.
5.3.1 Bounded Attacks: Untargeted
The results of various single-step and multi-step white-
box attacks for CIFAR-10 dataset are presented in Table-
1. FGSM-AT achieves the best robustness to single-step
attacks. However, it is not robust to multi-step attacks as ex-
plained by Kurakin et al. [17]. PGD-AT and RSS-AT show
the best accuracy of around 45% for 1000-step PGD attack.
1A3: The 500-step worst case PGD accuracy goes down from 37.5%
to 24.8% with 100 random restarts (over 1000 test samples)
Table 2: Computational complexity measured in terms of
absolute training time per epoch (seconds) and ratio w.r.t.
the proposed method (BPFC). This experiment is run on a
single Nvidia Titan-X GPU card.
Training
method
CIFAR-10 F-MNIST MNIST
seconds ratio seconds ratio seconds ratio
RSS-AT 127.2 1.8 23.8 2.0 24.1 1.7
PGD-AT 257.8 3.7 199.6 16.9 199.2 14.2
NT 39.6 0.6 9.3 0.8 8.9 0.6
BPFC (Ours) 69.4 1.0 11.8 1.0 14.0 1.0
Mixup [41] does not use Adversarial Training and achieves
an improvement over Normal Training (NT) in robustness
towards FGSM attack. However, it is not robust to PGD
attacks. The proposed method achieves a significant im-
provement over Normal Training and Mixup in robustness
to both single-step and multi-step attacks, despite not being
exposed to adversarial samples during training. As shown
in Table-2, the proposed method is faster than methods that
are robust to multi-step attacks (PGD-AT and RSS-AT).
As explained in Section-4.2.1, we consider ablation ex-
periments of Simple Quantization (A1) and addition of Uni-
form Noise (A2). The proposed method (BPFC) achieves
an improvement over these two baselines, indicating the sig-
nificance of the proposed formulation. Adding uniform ran-
dom noise in the range (−8/255, 8/255) produces an effect
similar to that of quantization by reducing the importance
given to LSBs for the classification task. Hence, we see
comparable results even for this ablation experiment.
We also consider an ablation experiment of using `1-
norm instead of `2-norm in Eq. (2). While the results us-
ing `1-norm (Table-1) show an improvement over the pro-
posed method, the 500-step worst-case PGD accuracy goes
down from 37.5% to 24.8% with 100 random restarts (over
1000 test samples represented equally across all classes),
indicating that it achieves robustness due to gradient mask-
ing. For the proposed approach, the PGD accuracy with 50
steps (34.68%) is similar to that with 1000 steps (34.44%).
Hence, we check 50-step PGD accuracy with 1000 random
restarts (for 1000 test samples) and find that the drop in
accuracy over multiple random restarts is negligible. The
accuracy drops from 35.6% to 34.9% over 1000 random
restarts, verifying that the robustness in the proposed ap-
proach is not due to gradient masking.
Table-3 shows the consolidated white-box results for
all datasets. The proposed method has significantly bet-
ter robustness to multi-step attacks when compared to
methods that do not use Adversarial training (NT and
Mixup). We also achieve results comparable to PGD-AT
and RSS-AT, while being significantly faster. Detailed re-
sults with Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets are re-
ported in Tables-S2 and S3 of the Supplementary.
Table 3: White-box setting: Recognition accuracy (%) of
different models on clean samples and adversarial samples
generated using PGD-1000 step attack.
Training
method
CIFAR-10 F-MNIST MNIST
Clean PGD Clean PGD Clean PGD
FGSM-AT 92.9 0.0 93.1 15.1 99.4 3.7
RSS-AT 82.3 45.8 87.7 71.8 99.0 90.4
PGD-AT 82.7 47.0 87.5 79.1 99.3 94.1
NT 92.3 0.0 92.0 0.3 99.2 0.0
Mixup 90.3 0.0 91.0 0.0 99.4 0.0
BPFC (Ours) 82.4 34.4 87.2 67.7 99.1 85.7
Table 4: Recognition accuracy (%) of the proposed method
(BPFC) on different 1000-step PGD attacks.
Attack CIFAR-10 F-MNIST MNIST
Untargeted 34.4 67.7 85.7
Targeted (Least Likely target) 65.2 85.5 95.6
Targeted (Random target) 63.1 83.5 94.8
Table 5: DeepFool and C&W attacks (CIFAR-10): Av-
erage `2 norm of the generated adversarial perturbations is
reported. Higher `2 norm implies better robustness. Fool-
ing rate (FR) represents percentage of test set samples that
are misclassified.
Training
method
DeepFool C&W
FR (%) Mean `2 FR (%) Mean `2
FGSM-AT 95.12 0.306 100 0.078
PGD-AT 90.78 1.098 100 0.697
RSS-AT 89.75 1.362 100 0.745
NT 94.66 0.176 100 0.108
Mixup 93.37 0.168 100 0.104
BPFC (Ours) 89.51 2.755 100 0.804
5.3.2 Bounded attacks: Targeted
We evaluate the robustness of BPFC trained models against
targeted attacks of two types, as discussed in this section.
In the first attack (Least Likely target), we set the target
class to be the least likely predicted class of a given image.
In the second variant (Random target), we assign random
targets to each image. We use 1000-step PGD attacks for
both these evaluations, and compare the robustness against
an untargeted PGD attack in Table-4. As expected, model
trained using the proposed approach is more robust to tar-
geted attacks, when compared to an untargeted attack.
5.3.3 Unbounded Attacks
We evaluate robustness of BPFC trained models to the un-
bounded attacks, DeepFool and Carlini-Wagner (C&W).
The goal here is to find the lowest `2-norm bound on per-
turbations that can result in 100% fooling rate for all sam-
Table 6: Black-box setting: Recognition accuracy (%) of
different models on FGSM black-box adversaries. Columns
represent the source model used for generating the attack.
Training
method
CIFAR-10 Fashion-MNIST MNIST
VGG19 ResNet18 Net-A M-LeNet Net-A M-LeNet
FGSM-AT 78.67 77.58 94.36 90.76 87.99 85.68
RSS-AT 79.80 79.99 84.99 84.16 95.28 95.19
PGD-AT 80.24 80.53 84.99 85.68 95.75 95.36
NT 36.11 15.97 34.71 16.67 29.94 16.60
Mixup 42.67 43.41 54.65 66.31 58.47 69.46
BPFC (Ours) 78.92 78.98 81.38 83.46 94.17 94.56
ples. We select the following hyperparameters for C&W
attack: search steps = 9, max iterations = 200, learning rate
= 0.01. For DeepFool attack, we set the number of steps as
100. With these settings, we achieve 100% fooling rate for
C&W attack with all the training methods. DeepFool does
not achieve 100% fooling rate for any of the methods. How-
ever, these results are consistent with the results reported in
literature [26]. The performance of these models is mea-
sured in terms of average `2-norm of the generated pertur-
bations. A higher value on the bound implies that the model
has better robustness. The results on CIFAR-10 are pre-
sented in Table-5. It can be observed that the BPFC trained
model is more robust to C&W attack when compared to all
other methods, including PGD-AT. The DeepFool results of
the proposed method can be compared directly only with
PGD-AT and RSS-AT, as they achieve similar fooling rates.
The proposed method achieves significantly improved ro-
bustness when compared to both these methods. Results
on Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets are presented in
Section-S2.1.2 of the Supplementary.
5.4. Performance against Black-box Attacks
We report accuracy against FGSM black-box attacks in
Table-6. We consider two source models for generation of
black-box attacks on each dataset; the first is a model with
a different architecture, and the second is a model with the
same architecture as that of the target model. In both cases,
and across all datasets, black-box accuracies are signifi-
cantly better with the proposed approach when compared
to other non-adversarial training methods (NT and Mixup).
Further, our results are comparable with those of adversarial
training methods. Results on multi-step black-box attacks
are presented in Section-S2.2 of the Supplementary.
5.5. Performance against Gradient-free Attacks
We check the robustness of our proposed approach
against the following gradient-free attacks on the CIFAR-10
dataset, to ensure that there is no gradient masking: attack
with random noise [3] and SPSA attack [35].
For the attack with random noise, we consider a random
sample of 1000 images from the test set of CIFAR-10, such
that all ten classes are equally represented. We randomly
select 105 samples from an `∞-ball of radius ε around each
data point (each pixel is an i.i.d. sample from a Uniform dis-
tribution) and compute the accuracy of these samples. We
find that the accuracy on these random samples is 79.76%,
which is slightly less than the accuracy on clean samples
(82.4%). We run another experiment to verify that every
image that is robust to PGD attack is also robust to ran-
dom noise. We run PGD attack for 50 steps and 100 ran-
dom restarts and identify the images that are robust to the
attack. We attack these images with 105 random noise-
perturbations each, and find that we achieve the expected
accuracy of 100%. Hence, we conclude that the attack with
random noise is not stronger than a gradient-based attack.
The SPSA attack [35] is a gradient-free attack that com-
putes a numerical approximation of the gradient along mul-
tiple random directions and approximates the final gradient
to be an average over these gradients. The attack becomes
stronger as more directions are used. We use the following
hyperparameters to generate the attack: δ = 0.01, learning
rate = 0.01, batch size = 128 and iterations = 5. We get an
accuracy of 70.5% against the SPSA attack using the pro-
posed approach. For the same attack, the accuracy of a PGD
trained model is 70.8%.
Therefore, we verify that gradient-based attacks are
stronger than gradient-free attacks, thereby confirming the
absence of gradient masking.
5.6. Performance against Adaptive Attacks
In this section, we consider methods that utilize knowl-
edge of the defense mechanism in creating stronger attacks.
We explore maximizing loss functions that are different
from the standard cross-entropy loss for generating adver-
sarial samples. We consider the CIFAR-10 dataset for this
experiment. Maximizing the same loss that is used for train-
ing, with the same hyperparameters, gives a slightly lower
accuracy (34.52%) when compared to PGD (34.68%) for a
50-step attack. However, this difference is not statistically
significant, and it may be due to the random nature of the
PGD attack. The worst accuracy across different hyperpa-
rameters in the loss function is 34.41%.
We also explore adding another term to the loss that is
maximized during a PGD attack. In addition to maximiz-
ing the training loss, we minimize the magnitude of k (= 5)
LSBs in the generated samples. This would encourage the
adversaries to have low magnitude LSBs, which could pos-
sibly be the samples where the defense was less effective.
However, even with this change, we get the same accuracy
as that of a standard PGD attack.
Therefore, the adaptive attacks are only as strong as a
PGD attack. We include more details on adaptive attacks in
Section-S2.3 of the Supplementary.
5.7. Basic Sanity Checks to Verify Robustness
In this section, we present results on the basic sanity
checks listed by Athalye et al. [1] to ensure that the model’s
robustness is not due to gradient masking.
• Results in Table-1 illustrate that iterative attacks (PGD
and I-FGSM) are stronger than an FGSM attack.
• White-box attacks are stronger than black-box attacks
based on results in Tables-3 and 6.
• We note that unbounded attacks reach 100% success
rate, and increasing distortion bound increases the suc-
cess rate of the attack (Fig.S2 of the Supplementary).
• As discussed in Section-5.5, gradient-based attacks are
stronger than gradient-free attacks.
• We note that cross-entropy loss on FGSM samples in-
creases monotonically with an increase in perturbation
size. (Fig.S3 of the Supplementary).
5.8. Scalability of the Proposed Method to ImageNet
We present results on ImageNet [5], which is a 1000-
class dataset with 1.2 million images in the training set and
50, 000 images in the validation set. The accuracy on a tar-
geted PGD 20-step attack is 32.91% with the proposed ap-
proach and 43.43% with a PGD-AT model [8]. The trend in
robustness when compared to PGD-AT is similar to that of
CIFAR-10 (Table-1), thereby demonstrating the scalability
of the proposed approach to large scale datasets. We present
detailed results in Section-S2.5 of the Supplementary.
6. Conclusions
We have proposed a novel Bit Plane Feature Consistency
(BPFC) regularizer, which improves the adversarial robust-
ness of models using a normal training regime. Results ob-
tained using the proposed regularizer are significantly bet-
ter than existing non-adversarial training methods, and are
also comparable to adversarial training methods. Since the
proposed method does not utilize adversarial samples, it is
faster than adversarial training methods. We demonstrate
through extensive experiments that the robustness achieved
is indeed not due to gradient masking. Motivated by hu-
man vision, the proposed regularizer leads to improved lo-
cal properties, which results in better adversarial robustness.
We hope this work would lead to further improvements on
the front of non-adversarial training methods to achieve ad-
versarial robustness in Deep Networks.
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Supplementary material
S1. Details on Architecture and Training
In this section, we present details related to the architec-
ture of models used and the impact of change in hyperpa-
rameters.
S1.1. Architecture details for Fashion-MNIST and
MNIST
We use a modified LeNet architecture for all our experi-
ments on Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets. This archi-
tecture has two additional convolutional layers when com-
pared to the standard LeNet architecture [19]. Architecture
details are presented in Table-S1.
S1.2. Impact of change in Hyperparameters
In this section, we study the effect of variation in the
hyperparameter λ (Eq. (2) in main paper). For CIFAR-10
dataset, we set the initial value of λ to be 1, and multiply
this by a constant factor every 25 epochs (3 times over 100
epochs). We present the results obtained by changing the
rate of increase in λ for CIFAR-10 dataset in Fig-S1. As
the rate increases, accuracy on clean samples reduces, and
accuracy on adversarial samples increases. The clean ac-
curacy saturates to about 70%, and accuracy on adversarial
samples saturates to approximately 40%. The best trade-off
between both is obtained at a rate of 15, where the clean ac-
curacy is 75.28% and adversarial accuracy is 40.6%. How-
ever, for a fair comparison with PGD training and other ex-
isting methods, we select the rate at which clean accuracy
matches with that of PGD-AT. Hence, the selected hyper-
parameter is 9.
We use a similar methodology for hyperparameter selec-
tion in MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets as well. For
these datasets, we set a fixed value of λ and do not increase
it over epochs. The value of λ is selected such that the accu-
racy on clean samples matches with that of a PGD trained
model.
S2. Details on Experimental Results
In this section, we present additional experimental re-
sults to augment our observations and results presented in
the main paper.
S2.1. White-box attacks
S2.1.1 Bounded attacks
Detailed results on Fashion-MNIST and MNIST white-box
attacks are presented in Tables-S2 and S3 respectively. The
Table S1: Network architectures used for Fashion-MNIST
and MNIST datasets. Modified LeNet is used for train-
ing the model and Net-A is used as a source for generating
black-box attacks.
Modified LeNet (M-LeNet) Net-A
{conv(32,5,5) + Relu}×2 Conv(64,5,5) + Relu
MaxPool(2,2) Conv(64,5,5) + Relu
{conv(64,5,5) + Relu}×2 Dropout(0.25)
MaxPool(2,2) FC(128) + Relu
FC(512) + Relu Dropout(0.5)
FC + Softmax FC + Softmax
Rate of increase in λ ⟶
0
25
50
75
100
5 10 15 20
Accuracy (%) on clean samples
Accuracy (%) on adversarial samples (PGD-50 steps)
Accuracy-Robustness trade-off w.r.t. rate of 
increase in λ
Figure S1: Plot of recognition accuracy (%) on clean
samples and PGD samples versus the rate of increase in
hyperparameter(λ) used for BPFC training. The selected
setting (9) is highlighted using a cross mark.
proposed method achieves significantly better robustness to
multi-step adversarial attacks when compared to Normal
training (NT), FGSM-AT and Mixup. The robustness to
multi-step attacks using the proposed approach is compa-
rable to that of PGD-AT and RSS-AT models, while being
faster than both approaches.
We run the PGD attack with multiple random restarts
on a random sample of 1000 test set images, equally dis-
tributed across all classes. This experiment is done to ensure
that the achieved robustness is not due to gradient masking.
The results with random restarts are presented in Table-S4.
Table S2: Fashion-MNIST: Recognition accuracy (%) of
models in a white-box attack setting.
Training
method Clean FGSM
IFGSM PGD (n-steps)
40 steps 40 100 1000
FGSM-AT 93.0 89.9 25.3 15.5 15.1 15.0
RSS-AT 87.7 81.2 77.5 72.0 71.8 71.8
PGD-AT 87.4 81.4 80.2 79.1 79.0 79.0
NT 92.0 16.6 2.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Mixup 91.0 37.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
BPFC (Ours) 87.1 73.1 70.2 68.0 67.7 67.7
Table S3: MNIST: Recognition accuracy (%) of models in
a white-box attack setting.
Training
method Clean FGSM
IFGSM PGD (n-steps)
40 steps 40 100 1000
FGSM-AT 99.4 89.6 29.4 13.8 4.9 3.7
RSS-AT 99.0 96.4 93.1 93.0 90.9 90.4
PGD-AT 99.3 96.2 94.9 95.4 94.3 94.1
NT 99.2 82.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mixup 99.4 58.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
BPFC (Ours) 99.1 94.4 92.0 91.5 86.6 85.7
Table S4: PGD attack with multiple random restarts:
Recognition accuracy (%) of different models on PGD ad-
versarial samples with multiple random restarts in a white-
box setting.
Training
method
CIFAR-10 Fashion-MNIST MNIST
PGD 50-steps PGD 100-steps PGD 100-steps
# restarts : 1 100 1000 1 100 1000 1 100 1000
PGD-AT 45.3 44.9 44.9 80.6 79.7 79.6 92.9 90.9 90.6
RSS-AT 45.2 44.7 44.7 74.1 73.4 73.2 88.7 86.3 85.6
BPFC (Ours) 35.6 35.1 34.9 69.4 68.4 68.3 84.0 80.5 79.9
Here, the overall accuracy is computed as an average over
the worst-case per-sample accuracy, as suggested by Carlini
et al. [3]. A 50-step PGD attack is performed on CIFAR-
10 dataset, and a 100-step attack is performed on Fashion-
MNIST and MNIST datasets. The degradation from 100
random restarts to 1000 random restarts is insignificant
across all datasets, indicating the absence of gradient mask-
ing. Degradation from a single run to 100 random restarts is
also insignificant for CIFAR-10 and Fashion-MNIST. How-
ever, the degradation is larger for MNIST, similar to the
trend observed with PGD-AT and RSS-AT models. It is
to be noted that the results corresponding to this experiment
may not coincide with those reported in Table-1 in the main
paper, and Tables-S2 and S3 in the Supplementary, as we
consider only a sample of the test set for this experiment.
Table S5: DeepFool and C&W attacks (Fashion-
MNIST): Average `2 norm of the generated adversarial per-
turbations is reported. Higher `2 norm implies better ro-
bustness. Fooling rate (FR) represents percentage of test set
samples that are misclassified.
Training
method
DeepFool C&W
FR (%) Mean `2 FR (%) Mean `2
FGSM-AT 94.34 1.014 100.0 0.715
PGD-AT 90.70 3.429 100.0 2.142
RSS-AT 91.22 2.762 99.9 1.620
NT 94.07 0.467 100.0 0.406
Mixup 92.22 0.226 100.0 0.186
BPFC (Ours) 90.94 3.620 100.0 1.789
Table S6: DeepFool and C&W attacks (MNIST): Aver-
age `2 norm of the generated adversarial perturbations is
reported. Higher `2 norm implies better robustness. Fool-
ing rate (FR) represents percentage of test set samples that
are misclassified.
Training
method
DeepFool C&W
FR (%) Mean `2 FR (%) Mean `2
FGSM-AT 99.36 3.120 100.0 1.862
PGD-AT 95.97 5.316 100.0 3.053
RSS-AT 94.41 4.894 98.2 2.725
NT 99.15 1.601 100.0 1.427
Mixup 91.82 0.518 100.0 0.498
BPFC (Ours) 97.47 6.289 100.0 3.041
S2.1.2 Unbounded attacks
The results with unbounded attacks (DeepFool [23] and
Carlini-Wagner (C&W) [4]) for Fashion-MNIST and
MNIST datasets are presented in Tables-S5 and S6 respec-
tively. We select the following hyperparameters for C&W
attack on Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets: search
steps = 9, max iterations = 500, learning rate = 0.01. For
DeepFool attack, we set the number of steps to 100 for both
Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets.
The average `2-norm of the generated perturbations to
achieve approximately 100% fooling rate using C&W at-
tack is higher with the proposed approach when compared
to most other approaches, with the exception of PGD-AT,
whose average `2-norm is marginally higher. DeepFool
attack does not achieve 100% fooling rate for Fashion-
MNIST and MNIST datasets, as was the case with CIFAR-
10 (ref: Section-5.3.3 of main paper). However, since the
fooling rates of the proposed approach are comparable to, or
greater than that of PGD-AT and RSS-AT, we can make a
fair comparison between the required `2-norm for achieving
the given fooling rate across these approaches. We observe
that the proposed approach is more robust to DeepFool at-
Table S7: PGD Black-box attacks: Recognition accu-
racy (%) of different models on PGD black-box adversaries.
Columns represent source model used for generating the at-
tack. 7-step attack is used for CIFAR-10 and 40-step attack
is used for Fashion-MNIST and MNIST
Training
method
CIFAR-10 Fashion-MNIST MNIST
VGG19 ResNet18 Net-A M-LeNet Net-A M-LeNet
FGSM-AT 85.85 85.61 94.27 91.52 79.8 74.11
RSS-AT 80.92 80.82 84.71 83.91 95.19 96.27
PGD-AT 81.37 81.22 85.16 85.71 96.52 96.69
NT 16.86 0 27.10 0.33 4.64 0.03
Mixup 30.16 29.53 49.07 60.71 31.4 58.25
BPFC (Ours) 80.42 80.15 81.45 83.00 95.31 95.91
Table S8: MI-FGSM [7] Black-box attacks: Recognition
accuracy (%) of different models on MI-FGSM black-box
adversaries. Columns represent source model used for gen-
erating the attack. 7-step attack is used for CIFAR-10 and
40-step attack is used for Fashion-MNIST and MNIST
Training
method
CIFAR-10 Fashion-MNIST MNIST
VGG19 ResNet18 Net-A M-LeNet Net-A M-LeNet
FGSM-AT 76.44 74.22 94.61 92.11 79.95 73.92
RSS-AT 80.21 80.10 84.61 84.02 96.11 95.28
PGD-AT 80.47 80.59 84.98 85.58 95.56 95.34
NT 12.98 0.04 28.28 4.69 12.48 1.93
Mixup 35.74 25.22 50.60 63.32 43.72 62.98
BPFC (Ours) 79.04 79.04 81.33 82.70 94.03 94.46
tack, when compared to both of these approaches.
S2.2. Black-box attacks
Multi-step attacks such as I-FGSM are known to show
weak transferability across models in a black-box setting
[17]. Dong et al. [7] introduced a momentum term in the op-
timization process of I-FGSM, so as to increase the transfer-
ability of the generated adversarial samples. This attack is
referred to as the Momentum Iterative FGSM (MI-FGSM)
attack.
The results corresponding to black-box multi-step PGD
and MI-FGSM attacks are presented in Tables-S7 and S8
respectively. We consider two source models for black-box
attacks on each of the models trained: one with the same
architecture as the target model, and second with a different
architecture. For Fashion-MNIST and MNIST, the architec-
ture of the second model (Net-A) is presented in Table-S1.
For CIFAR-10, we consider a second model with VGG-19
[28] architecture. The proposed approach achieves a signifi-
cant improvement in robustness to adversarial samples with
respect to Normal Training (NT) and Mixup, and compara-
ble results with respect to the adversarial training methods,
across all the datasets.
S2.3. Adaptive attacks
In this section, we explain the adaptive attacks used in
this paper in greater detail. We utilize information related
to the proposed regularizer to construct potentially stronger
attacks when compared to a standard PGD attack. We max-
imize the following loss function to generate an adaptive
attack corresponding to each data sample xi:
Li = λce ce(f(xi), yi) + λg‖g(xi)− g(q(xi))‖22
− λLSB‖xi − q(xi)‖22 (S1)
The quantized image corresponding to xi is denoted by
q(xi). We consider f(.) as the function mapping of the
trained network, from an image xi, to its corresponding
softmax output f(xi). The corresponding pre-softmax out-
put of the network is denoted by g(xi). The ground truth
label corresponding to xi is denoted by yi. The first term
in the above equation is the cross-entropy loss, the second
term is the BPFC regularizer proposed in this paper, and
the third term is an `2 penalty term on the magnitude of k
LSBs. We consider the value of k to be the same as that
used for training the models (ref: Section-5.1 in the main
paper). The coefficients of these loss terms are denoted by
λce, λg and λLSB respectively.
Maximizing the cross-entropy term leads to finding sam-
ples that are misclassified by the network. Maximizing the
BPFC loss results in finding samples which do not comply
with the BPFC regularizer imposed during training. Min-
imizing the third term would help find samples with low
magnitude LSBs, which are possibly the points where the
defense is less effective. The objective of an adversary is to
cause misclassification, which can be achieved by maximiz-
ing only the first term in Eq. (S1). However, the proposed
defense mechanism could lead to masking of the true solu-
tion, thereby resulting in a weak attack. Thus, the role of
the remaining terms, which take into account the defense
mechanism, is to aid the optimization process in finding
such points, if any. The remainder of the algorithm used
is similar to that proposed by Madry et al. [22].
The results with adaptive attacks for CIFAR-10,
Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets are presented in
Tables-S9, S10 and S11 respectively. We consider the fol-
lowing coefficients in Eq. (S1) to find a strong adaptive at-
tack:
• λce = 1, λg = 0, λLSB = 0
This corresponds to a standard PGD attack [22], which
serves as a baseline in this table. The goal of the re-
maining experiments is to find an attack stronger than
this.
• λce = 1, λg = variable, λLSB = 0
This case corresponds to using the training loss di-
rectly to find adversarial samples. We find that lower
Table S9: CIFAR-10: Recognition accuracy (%) of the
model trained using the proposed approach on adversarial
samples generated using adaptive attacks.
Adaptive attack Loss coefficients n-step Adaptive attack
λce λg λLSB 7 20 50
PGD 1 0 0 41.72 35.74 34.68
Variation in λg
(λce = 1 and
λLSB = 0)
1 0.1 0 41.67 35.65 34.61
1 1 0 41.49 35.42 34.52
1 10 0 42.15 36.14 35.30
Variation in λg
(λce = 0 and
λLSB = 0)
0 0.1 0 41.65 35.62 34.58
0 0.5 0 41.54 35.45 34.41
0 1 0 64.35 59.95 59.16
0 10 0 42.15 36.15 35.30
Variation in λLSB
(λce = 1 and
λg = 0)
1 0 1 42.00 35.96 34.89
1 0 10 48.49 41.40 39.60
Variation in λLSB
(λce = 1 and
λg = 1)
1 1 1 41.67 35.47 34.52
1 1 10 46.07 37.54 35.79
values of λg lead to stronger attacks, while still not be-
ing significantly stronger than baseline. This indicates
that addition of the BPFC regularizer does not help in
the generation of a stronger attack.
• λce = 0, λg = variable, λLSB = 0
For CIFAR-10 dataset, this case is able to generate at-
tacks which are as strong as PGD, without using the
cross-entropy term. This indicates that the BPFC loss
term is relevant in the context of generating adversarial
samples. However, addition of this to the cross-entropy
term does not generate a stronger attack, as the de-
fense is not masking gradients that prevents generation
of stronger adversaries. However, for Fashion-MNIST
and MNIST datasets, this attack is weaker than PGD.
• λce = 1, λg = variable, λLSB = variable
Next, we consider the case of introducing the third
term that imposes a penalty on high magnitude LSBs.
Addition of this term with or without the BPFC term
does not help generate a stronger attack, indicating
that this training regime does not create isolated points
in the `∞-ball around each sample, which correspond
to points with low magnitude LSBs. This can be at-
tributed to the addition of pre-quantization noise.
Overall, the adaptive attacks constructed based on the
knowledge of the defense mechanism do not lead to
stronger attacks. This leads to the conclusion that the pro-
posed defense does not merely make the process of finding
adversaries harder, but results in learning models that are
truly robust.
Table S10: Fashion-MNIST: Recognition accuracy (%) of
the model trained using the proposed approach on adversar-
ial samples generated using adaptive attacks.
Adaptive attack Loss coefficients n-step Adaptive attack
λce λg λLSB 40 100 500
PGD 1 0 0 68.03 67.75 67.71
Variation in λg
(λce = 1 and
λLSB = 0)
1 1 0 69.41 69.22 69.19
1 10 0 76.72 76.44 76.46
1 25 0 78.95 78.8 78.79
Variation in λg
(λce = 0 and
λLSB = 0)
0 1 0 80.45 80.23 80.2
0 10 0 80.46 80.24 80.22
0 25 0 80.46 80.22 80.18
0 50 0 80.46 80.22 80.18
Variation in λLSB
(λce = 1 and
λg = 0)
1 0 1 68.2 67.98 67.95
1 0 10 71.32 70.98 70.98
Variation in λLSB
(λce = 1 and
λg = 25)
1 25 1 78.96 78.8 78.77
1 25 10 78.91 78.74 78.76
Table S11: MNIST: Recognition accuracy (%) of the model
trained using the proposed approach on adversarial samples
generated using adaptive attacks.
Adaptive attack Loss coefficients n-step Adaptive attack
λce λg λLSB 40 100 500
PGD 1 0 0 91.49 86.6 85.63
Variation in λg
(λce = 1 and
λLSB = 0)
1 1 0 92.99 89.13 88.2
1 10 0 94.58 91.75 91.04
1 30 0 94.74 91.99 91.26
Variation in λg
(λce = 0 and
λLSB = 0)
0 1 0 94.8 91.96 91.34
0 10 0 94.8 91.97 91.34
0 30 0 94.79 91.98 91.38
0 50 0 94.79 91.97 91.35
Variation in λLSB
(λce = 1 and
λg = 0)
1 0 1 91.56 86.96 86.01
1 0 10 93.51 90.11 89.41
Variation in λLSB
(λce = 1 and
λg = 30)
1 30 1 94.72 91.98 91.33
1 30 10 94.7 91.97 91.36
S2.4. Basic Sanity Checks to verify Robustness
In this section, we present details related to Section-5.7
in the main paper. The plots of accuracy verses perturba-
tion size in Fig.S2 demonstrate that unbounded attacks are
able to reach 100% success rate. It can be observed that
increasing the distortion bound increases the success rate of
the attack. Fig-S3 shows a plot of the average loss on FGSM
samples generated on the test set, versus perturbation size of
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Figure S2: Plot of recognition accuracy (%) on PGD samples generated on test set versus perturbation size of PGD 7-step
attack. The model’s accuracy is zero for large perturbation sizes indicating the absence of gradient masking.
Figure S3: Plot of average loss on FGSM samples generated on test set versus perturbation size of FGSM attack.
Table S12: ImageNet (white-box attacks): Recognition
accuracy (%) of BPFC trained model and PGD-AT model
on ImageNet dataset under white-box attack setting. Accu-
racy is reported on the following untargeted attacks: FGSM
attack, I-FGSM 20-step attack (IFGSM), PGD 20-step at-
tack and PGD 100-step attack. Accuracy on PGD 20-
step targeted attack (with random targets) is also reported
(TPGD).
Training
method Clean FGSM
IFGSM PGD PGD TPGD
(20) (20) (100) (20)
PGD-AT 47.91 24.42 21.52 19.39 19.06 43.43
BPFC (Ours) 40.82 19.97 15.93 13.41 12.82 32.91
the FGSM attack. It can be observed that the loss increases
monotonically with an increase in perturbation size. These
two plots confirm that there is no gradient masking effect
[1] in the models trained using the proposed approach.
S2.5. Results on ImageNet
We report results on ImageNet dataset using the pro-
posed method and PGD-AT in Table-S12. The architecture
used for both methods is ResNet-50 [12]. We use the PGD-
AT pre-trained model from [8] for comparison. We train the
proposed method for 125 epochs and decay learning rate by
a factor of 10 at epochs 35, 70 and 95. Similar to CIFAR-
10, we start with a λ of 1 and step it up by a factor of 9 at
epochs 35 and 70. We use a higher step-up factor of 20 at
epoch 95 to improve robustness. Since training ImageNet
models is computationally intensive, we report results us-
ing similar hyperparameters as that of CIFAR-10. However,
tuning hyperparameters specifically for ImageNet can lead
to improved results. Accuracy on black-box FGSM attack
is 47.39% for PGD-AT and 40.41% for the BPFC trained
model. We note that the trend in robustness when com-
pared to PGD-AT is similar to that of CIFAR-10, thereby
demonstrating the scalability of the proposed approach to
large scale datasets.
